The Beginnings of the Cold War

1) Why did the USSR and the USA emerge as superpowers after WWII? 
> Militarily:

- In overcoming Germany, the US had become the number-one airpower in the world.
- Likewise, the Soviet Union had become the number-one land force in the world.
- The balance of power had shifted away from Britain and France, as they had been unable to defeat Germany and thus were now "second rank" powers.

- The Soviet Union was now the strongest military force of all its neighbors (regional powerhouse).

> Economically,

- The US economy was greatly strengthened by the war, and was thus able to outproduce all other nations.

- The US was committed to a free trade economy (increasing market competition).

- Because the US now controlled the economy, it could move to returning both economic and political stability to Europe.

- The Soviet Union was now the strongest economic force of all its neighbors, who needed its support.

> Politically, 

- In the eyes of Europe, US democracy had triumphed over German and Italian fascism.

- Likewise, Soviet Communism had triumphed over fascism. 

- The USSR's tremendous losses in WWII placed it in an influential democratic position in the post-war conferences.

- The USSR had the political strength to return "order" to Europe. Communism a probable candidate to fill the postwar political vacuum.
2) Eight steps that lead to the Cold War:

8. Three wartime conferences: Tehran (Nov 1943), Yalta (Feb 1945), Potsdam (July 1945)

-Exposed ideological differences of the West powers with the USSR for the post war world, especially through the tensions at Yalta (disputes over Poland's borders and  Poland's government)

7. Kennan's Long Telegram (Feb 1946)

-Claimed the Soviet Union was insecure, hostile to the West, forcibly advancing Stalinist policies, and repressive of its people; great influence over Truman and eventually America's people

6. Churchill's 'Iron Curtain' Speech (March 1946)

-Publicly stated the West's distrust of the USSR; sparked immediate, harsh USSR reaction (perceived West as racist)

5. Truman Doctrine (March 1947) & Cominform (Oct 1947)

-US becoming politically involved in Europe (no longer pursuing isolationist policies)

4. Marshall Plan (June 1947)

-The economic reflection of the Truman Doctrine

3. Red Army Occupation of Eastern Europe (1945-1947)

-Impossible to move, as already physically standing on Eastern Europe territories; began forcibly imposing Communist policies

2. Czech Coup (Feb 1948)

-Utilized to push through Marshall Plan; Czech republic felt isolated and so caved to USSR's pressures to become a Communist nation

1. Berlin Blockade (June 1948)

-A failure for the USSR (tried to force West districts out of Berlin, which remained divided)

Ultimately, this lead to the establishment of NATO (April 1949) and the creation of West Germany (Sept 1949) and East Germany (Oct 1949) as separate states.

Gwynne Dyer on the Development of War

• Summarize that evolution of war from "mass war" to "total war" as Dyer describes it.
  "Mass war" is simply war on a large scale. This is more closely exemplified by WWI, in the sheer numbers and production of military equipment produced and individuals involved (also large count of deaths and casualties).
  "Total war" involves all of the elements of mass war in addition to the totalitarian expansion of war into every possible aspect of society: economy (mobilized for the war), media/propaganda, civilian consumption/standard of living, and even politics. As Dyer notes,
  
   "So was the willingness of whole nations in arms, stiffened by patriotism and propaganda and harnessed by totalitarian controls (which were imposed in almost every warring country regardless of its peacetime political system) to accept the most terrible sacrifice without flinching" (War, 89).
  All in all, the evolution of total war from mass war is a grander version of, say, the arms race. Each nation continually strives to outdo the other to a point of no control, until weapons become more and more destructive, "to be used according to principles now universally accepted" (85). Thus, as Dyer maintains, if the means of war have become total, so must be the ends: total victory and unconditional surrender.
  

  Gen. Douglas MacArthur: "The only way you can meet force is by force."
  

  
  
• Key qualities of total war:

- Requires "total victory"

- Sacrifices of civilians

- "Propaganda lies become the truth..."; depict enemies as morally evil to build up civilian morale

- Total state control over citizens and economy; encroaches on government (dictatorship?)

- Attrition (analogous to blitzkrieg)

- War waged against civilian populations (bombers, tactics, preying on civilian morale, ATOM BOMB)

- The causes, aims, and means are no different than the devastating ends

• Is total war ethical?
  
  If we are to maintain any form of ethics within us as humanity, then NO NO NO it is not.                   
  One-sided view of the benefits of total war.

To What Extent Do I Agree with Richard Overy?

Richard Overy argues that “The war was won in 1945 not from German weaknesses but from Allied strengths.” How far do you agree with this statement?

Although it is true that the Allies may have shared a larger number of strengths than the sum of German weaknesses, per se, it can be argued that the significance of the few Axis’ lapses did in fact largely impact the outcome of the war, at least in equal measure to the Allies’ advantages. This can be attributed to the late, and thus decisive, timing in which monumental events began to take place, both in the Allies visible improvements to their war tactics and strategies and in the German’s definitive weaknesses.

First and foremost, the Allied powers seemed to make their final improvements at the most crucial moments. For example, in officially absorbing America in to the Allied side in 1941, the Allies were able to mobilise their economy and their wartime industry with compelling force. The Soviet Union, too, greatly contributed to the war cause by tactically transporting much of their industry east of the Urals; this both prevented German seizure of their factory and helped the USSR in maintaining and increasing their war economy, the latter of which Germany failed to accomplish. These contributions were both vital in increasing the Allied powers’ numerical advantage in not only the quantity of the weaponry output, but also the quality. Furthermore, the Allied powers were buoyed by a wide berth of civilian support and patriotism. The significance of this, again, became evident near the final grueling months of the war, as Allied morale and fighting ferocity maintained a steady incline, contrasting sharply with the German Wehrmacht’s deterioration. Lastly, the Allies’ strategy proved itself far superior than the Germans’ near the culmination of the war. Through the former’s pinpoint offensives against Germany, wearing strategic bombing, and strong emphasis on reinforcements, the Allies bore a force that slowly but surely wore an underprepared and underfilled Germany down to ultimate surrender. All in all, the Allied strengths were indeed greater in number than the German’s weaknesses; yet perhaps it is the coincidence of the two, a timing favorable to the Allies, which most ensured an Allied victory in the end.

As for the part of the Germans, a few highly critical mistakes near the climax of the war was sure to contribute the the Allied cause at least equally so to the latter’s strengths. Foremost in precedence are the tactical errors committed by Hitler. In his taking over in commanding the Wehrmacht himself, Hitler imbued his own army with disastrous, one-sided decisions which proved fatal to the entirety of the Axis powers in the end. This can be seen in Hitler’s impatience with The Battle of Britain, as leaving the key Allied power undefeated attributed to an ongoing war in the West, eventually leading to a two-front war  for Germany. Yet another tactical error made on Hitler’s part was his misinterpretation of American intentions and capabilities, hence his decision to openly declare war on America in Sept. 1941. This allowed America to put Germany on the defensive with “devastating bombing raids”, eventually opening up the Second Front in 1944, and even allowing the Americans to amalgamate with British troops in their forceful invasion of Italy. Lastly, Hitler’s overall military conduct proved itself very poor; the Fuhrer failed in both unifying his own front-line operations in combat with the back-up reinforcements and supplies, as well as with lack of preparation in Operation Barbarossa and communication with his own fellow Axis powers. In such a way, it is clear that while the German’s errors may be broadly defined as tactical, their timing as a whole was a large factor in their deadly impact to the Axis side.

Ultimately, it was the timing of both sides strengths and weaknesses which culminated in the Allied victory of World War II.

WWII in Europe: Battle of Britain & Operation Barbarossa

Why did Hitler assume that his air-force could defeat Britain alone?
The Luftwaffe had no airforce to oppose it, which would cause the Royal Navy to be exposed and thus prompt Britain to "come to the negotiating table."

What factor, in your opinion, was the most important in Britain's victory in the Battle of Britain?
The most important factor in Britain's victory was their revolutionary warning system: radar. This also allowed Britain to devote more planes to the war rather than expending them on patrol runs.

Why did Hitler invade into the Balkans and why was this significant?
Hitler invaded the Balkans because Italy's offensives were failing. The entry of the German's into the Balkan war was significant because its strength in attacking Greece diverted British troops from the war in North Africa, weakening the Allied line there. Additionally, and unfortunately for the Axis powers, Hitler's contribution in the Balkans delayed his plan to attack USSR by six crucial weeks.

What were Hitler's motives for attacking the USSR?
Seizing the USSR would help Hitler achieve Lebensraum ("living space") for the German race. The East also contained valuable natural resources, such as oil. What's more, Hitler wished to demolish the "inferior" Slavs and their Communism.

What factors slowed the initial blitzkrieg of Russia?
The heavy rains of October and harsh winters greatly impeded Germany's Operation Barbarossa. Germany's failure to prepare for the brutal Russian weather was due in part to their overconfidence, believing they would be victorious before the crux of winter set in. In the end, neither Leningrad or Moscow were seized.

"Every Man A Soldier" Discussion

"Every Man A Soldier" (John Keegan)

1) Link between WWI and WWII:
- It was not necessarily the causes the were unique for each of these wars, but the immense scale.
2) Can politics be logical/moral? Is it necessary to be immoral to be practical?
- Politics can be both logical and moral. At times, it may be more practical to follow through on an immoral decision, but not always. Additional point: what may be moral (and practical) to one side may be immoral to another (atom bomb on Hiroshima potentially saved American lives, but decimated many Japanese civilians).
3) What is a more "fruitful...approach to the issue of causes"?
- A more poignant question to consider is how the two world wars were made possible, with the "enormity of events" leading up to them.
4) "For the truth of the twentieth-century European civilization was that the world it dominated was pregnant with war."
- "Inevitable" (?) due to large population size (due to drugs, diet, and draining), wealth, railway control, improvements in (weapon) technology (with the aid of the Industrial Revolution), and "permanent surplus" of food, energy, and raw materials. In Keegan's words, there was just too much "blood, iron, and gold" to go sitting around, which quite possibly became the egotistical temptation that contributed to the commencing of the World Wars.
5) Factors Keegan describes that led to WWII:
" "
6) What is the impact of nationalism on the individual? What role did it play in the spawning of WWII?
- Nationalism can impact an individual in frighteningly powerful ways. Obsessive devotion can transcend inspiration, causing the individual to blindly sacrifice everything for the face of the cause. Oftentimes, however, this single-mindedness can greatly increase the success of rallying men for the military. A shift in thinking Keegan address which was found interesting is the difference between an 18th century soldier, viewed as having "surrendered [their] rights", as service was a punishment, to the idealization of the 19th century soldier who "wanted to be what he was" and carried with him honor.
7) "States cannot survive in a military vacuum; without armed forces a state does not exist."
- There are many examples of this post-WWI. For example, both Italy's and Germany's existing government caved due to their inability to maintain structured authority; in their "vacuum", a fierce, militaristic government was often favored by the people. Without these armed forces (either in convergence with the government or as the compliment of it), the nation would be all too vulnerable to other imposing nations.
8) "War had taken ahold of them...and would never let them go."
These words describe the arresting lifestyle which took hold of soldiers as they fell into the dependence of routine military life. An interesting paradox of such a lifestyle is, as Keegan fathoms, "escape from freedom was often a real liberation" of having to make daily decisive choices.
9) Did Keegan believe WWII was inevitable? Do you agree?
All in all, yes he did. In fact, he even uses that very word, "inevitable" to describe the pregnancy of war in the interrelation of the global society. For me, however, I would have to disagree, quite simply for the reason that, ultimately, nothing in history is inevitable. Nothing is predictable. Any last minute shift at and given moment is possible.

6)

Work Cited:
Keegan, John. The Second World War. New York, N.Y., U.S.A.: Penguin, 1990. Print.

WWII Timeline (1939-1941)

Enjoy!

Outline of Collective Security's Failure (1920-1935)

Why did collective security fail to keep the peace between 1920 and 1935?

What was the League of nations intended to do?

To what extent do you believe the League of Nations was able to accomplish this based on its structure according to the League of Nations Covenant?

Why did collective security fail in 1930s?

www.un.org

THESIS: Collective security failed to keep peace among nations between 1920 and 1935 primarily because its organizational body, the League of Nations, relied too much on the "goodwill" of nations for support, thus failing to provide consistent follow-through and uphold cohesiveness, as well as being complicated by the negative economic, political, and martial effects of the Great Depression.

TS 1: First and foremost, the League of Nation's reliance on "the goodwill of nations to work" culminated in a faulty foundation from the onset.
CD: The 26 articles of the League's covenant were often ambiguous.
CM: This led to much confusion and division over numerous issues
CM: Hence, more often than not, collective security was held at a standstill while external aggression ensued (ie. Manchurian Crisis)
CD: No formal regulations were mandated defining the use of a League Army; rather, military forces for disciplinary use were merely voluntary.
CM: After the horrors and deprecating losses of WWI, few if any countries were willing to relinquish their troops for use in a "greater cause" that would in turn expose themselves
CM: This led to the League's lack of backbone; not once in its history were military forces used

TS 2: Furthermore, it was evident from the very first territorial disputes in the 1920s that the League of Nations was simply unable to provide consistent follow-through and universal consensus.
CD: Absence of major global powers (such as US)
CM: The collection of members was primarily European
CM: This prevented effective economic sanctions as nonviolent punishment (lacked economic depth)
CM: In addition, smaller member countries were dependent on the League for territorial and economic support, while being fairly unable to provide any stability to the League in return (lacked political depth)
CM: The lack of the "keystone" US in the League also resulted in a deadlocked division between Britain and France, who often argued opposing points. Thus, the "Bridge" was rendered ineffective.
CD: Inconsistent imposition of consequences  (Territorial disputes of 1920s, Manchurian Crisis 1931, Abyssinian Invasion 1935)
CM: Caused confusion (and dually, encouragement) among both member and nonmember nations
CM: Exposed the League as weak and ineffective time and time again
CD: Initial exclusion of some nations from the League (ie. Germany)
CM: Hypocrisy of League's ideal (international unity, not exclusion)
CM: Discordance, discomfort, and bitterness among excluded members
CD: Member Leagues began acting unilaterally (France in Ruhr Crisis)
CM: Discredited integrity of League in maintaining order and discipline
CM: Increased international tensions both within and outside of League

TS 3: Just as political and economic concordances between nations were settling down, the Great Depression of 1929 arose and effected all. 
CD: Member nations became even more infatuated with their own domestic issues
CM: Thus they turned their shoulders to the outside world in terms of collective security aid
CM: Economic sanctions became unfeasible
CM: Military forces and radical party changes gained hold in countries worldwide (German shift to right, French modern govt replaced by radical left-wing, Britain slant to right, end of Japanese liberal policies)
CD: Japan was urged to expand to increase its depreciating economy.
CM: Cause of Manchurian Crisis, which revealed the Japanese government's lack of control over its military
CM: League of Nations demonstrated severe inefficiency and, most notably, authority